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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN DUANE 
ROBISON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ALLISON ROBISON 1and 
THORPE ROBISON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10034 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The appellant has appealed from a decision of 
the Fifth District Court, Millard County, granting 
the respondents' summ1ary judgment against the ap-
pellant's claim that respondents were liable to him 
for injuries sustained when he was struck by a rock 
on the respondents' land while assisting in blasting 
operations. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon motion of the respondents based upon 
the depositions of the parties, the Honorable C. Nel-
son Day, Judge, granted summ'ary judgment against 
appellant and ruled that the appellant had assumed 
the risk of his injury. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents submit that the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment ~against the 
appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents submit the following state-
ment of facts as being a more correct recital of the 
evidence. 
The evidence before the court consisted of the 
depositions of the appellant and respondents. There 
were no affidavits or other indication tha:t any con-
trary evidence was available. 
The appellant's deposition will be cited as 
(A.D.), the respondents ( R.D.), and the record 
(R.). 
The trial court entered a memorandum deci-
sion, which, it is submitted, w:as based primarily 
upon the appellant's testimony (R. 14-16). In addi-
tion, the trial court indicated that it did not feel 
the concept of absolute liability was applicable to 
the instant case, but felt the amended complaint did 
state :a cause of action based upon an allegation of 
negligence (R. 15, 16). However, the court ruled 
that in any event the appellant had assumed the 
risk ('R. 14-16) or was himself negligent. 
On May 1, 1962 the respondents were engaged 
in ·constructing a ditch upon land which they l~ased 
from a third person. At no time did any of- the 
adtions complained of occur off of the respondents 
2 
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property (App. Deposition A.D. p. 35). The con-
struction was in a non-populous farming area in 
Millard County. 
In the morning the appellant rode a horse over 
to the respondents' property to see how the work 
on the ditch was progressing, (A.D. p. 21-24) stayed 
for about 30 minutes and left (A.D. 23). He did not 
at 1any time come onto the respondents' property at 
their invitati'on, but instead was allowed to watch 
and assist as a neighbor.! Later on the same day 
at about 1:30 or 2:00 p.m. the 1appellant again rode 
back to the respondents' property where dynamite 
blasting operations were being conducted (A.D. 26). 
He observed that the respondents and one Nolan 
Jackson were blasting and using dynamite (R. 1'5). 
The appellant, contrary to the !assertion in his brief, 
had seen blasting on a prior occasion, although quite 
awhile prior to the instant event (A.D. 34). Fur-
ther, the appellant is a mature married man in his 
middle years (A.D. 34). 
Upon arrival appellant discussed the blasting 
operations with the respondents and suggested using 
a ''bull prick drill" in preparing the rock for blast-
ing (A.D. 27). He observed the respondents pre-
paring a blast, rode back out of danger, got off 
his horse and into a pickup truck while a dynamite 
blast was made (A.D. 28-29). He noticed the dis-
tance of the blast (R. 15) and went back to the 
1 Contrary to appellants' assertion, this would not make the appel-
lant a guest rather he would be a bare 'licensee. Prosser, Torts 2nd 
Ed., p. 445, 446. 
3 
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blasting site while a second blast was prepared 
(A.D. 27-29). !The second preparation did not ex-
plode, and the parties returned to the blast site. 
An addi tiona I half stick of dynamite was added, 
which appellant observed, land rocks, and mud plater 
were placed on the dynamite (R. 15). The appel-
lant suggested putting a big rock on the dynamite, 
and gave advice to respondents on the blasting. 
(A.D. '28, 3'3). From this time on the appellant can 
no longer remember what occurred (A.D. 30, 34). 
Although !appellant in his brief suggests the possi-
bility of a misfire or early explosion before he had 
time to get away, his deposition clearly shows no 
evidentiary basis for this supposition since he clear-
ly stated he could not remember what occurred, 
apparently because of his injury (R. 30, 34). 
The depositions of the other witnesses show 
that prior to the blast the ~appellant had observed 
the setting of the fuse, recommended a rock tamp, 
got on his horse and rode about 450 feet from the 
blast site ( R. 1'5) . The respondents' depos1 tions are 
to the effect that the appellant placed rocks on the 
dynamite, there is no doubt but that he recommended 
such procedure (A.D. 29). The respondents drove 
their trucks to the s'ame ar~a where the appellant 
was sitting on his horse ( R. 15) . Appellant did not 
get off his horse but remained in the saddle await-
ing the blast. The dynamite exploded and a rock 
struck the appellant in the head. 
All the blasting occurred on the respondents' 
4 
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own farm lands and the injury to appellant also oc-
curred on the respondents' lands. The trial judge, 
based upon the evidence, determ'ined that the appel-
land was negligent and assumed the risk (R. 16). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE I.;IABfLITY IS 
NOT APPLIC.A!BLE IN UTAH TO THE INSTANT CASE. 
'The trial court ruled that the instant case did 
not raise a fact situration where the rule of absolute 
liability should be applied. The blasting in this case 
was being conducted in a remote rural unpopulated 
area in support of the construction of an irrigation 
ditch. At no time did any trespass occur to neigh-
boring lands nor was the appellant injured while 
on his own property. 
It is recognized that there is some authority 
supporting a contention tha:t the common law rule 
imposing strict liability for the carrying on of an 
ultrahazardous activity on one's lands which causes 
injury to another (Rylands v. Fletcher, 1866 L.R. 
1 Ex. 265) is applicable to blasting, 20 A.L.R. 2d 
1372. However, there is substantial support for the 
contrary rule requiring proof of negligence. Bacon 
v. Kansas City Terminal R. Co., 109 Kan. 234, 19'8 
Bac. 942; Reynolds v. W. H. Henman Co., 75 Atl. 
2d 802 (Me. 1950); 20 A.L.R. 2d 1360. California 
has apparently taken the position that engaging in 
blasting will impose absolute liability in a crowded 
5 
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area for any damages arising as a result of the 
blasting, 20 A.L.R. 2d 1382 ( 1950), but that negli-
gence must be shown where the blasting occurs in 
a remote area, Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal. App. 2d 778, 
214 P. 2d 50 ( 1950). Several of the most recent de-
cisions have refused to apply the absolute liability 
concept and have required a showing of fault based 
on negligence, Boonville Collieries Corp. v. Reynolds, 
163 N.E. 2d 6'27 (Ind. App.); Dallon v. Demos Bros., 
135 N.E. 2d 646 (Mass.); 20 ALR 2d 1360. The 
doctri'ne of ra;bsolu1te liability has been soundly criti-
cized by legal scholars, Prosser, Torts 2nd Ed., Sec. 
59. 
'The obvious basis for criticism is thJat such a 
concept dispenses with fault thus socializing liabil-
ity without socializing responsibility for the loss. 
Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 Har. L. Rev. 
801 (1916). Further, the obvious objection exists 
that to declare a function as ultra-hazardous 1and 
thus impose strict lia:bility ignores the fact that in 
some circumstances an activity may be quite safe, 
whereas under others, land with subsequent knowl-
edge, the same activity may be perfectly safe. As 
is noted, Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and Non-
Natural User of Land, 3 Camb. L. J. 376, 387 
( 192'9) : 
" ... just as there is nothing which is at all 
times ;and in all circumstances dangerous, so 
'it seems that there is scarcely anything which 
is in all circumstances safe." 
This probably accounts for the position of the Calif-
6 
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ornia courts that negligence must be shown before 
liability is imposed from blasting in remote areas, 
Alonso v. Hills, supra. Indeed the use of dynJamite 
is comparatively safe when viewed against other 
modern day industrial 'activities. 
The decisions imposing strict liability for blast-
ing have most often done so on the basis of trespass, 
arguing that the concussion or debris leaving the 
land results in a trespass onto the land of another. 
Prosser, Torts 2nd Ed. Sec. 59; Madsen v. East Jor-
dan In·. Co., 101 Utah 55'2, 125 P. 2d 794 (1942). 
The Utah Supreme Court has not directly passed on 
the matter, and it is submitted should not follow the 
rule of absolute liability. In llfadsen v. East Jordan 
bT. Co., supra., plaintiff sued for loss of mink he 
claimed to have suffered as the result of the defen-
dant's blasting which frightened his mink and caus-
ed them to slaughter their young. The main opinion 
notes the division of authority on the question of 
absolute liability and further notes that at that 
time the majority rule applied the concept of strict 
liability. However, the court did not have to decide 
which concept to follow. It held that the disposition 
of the animals to ki 11 their young was such an inter-
vening cause that the loss could not be said to be the 
result of the defendant's blasting. Justice Wolfe, 
however, concurring, made it clear that negligence 
would have to be shown to permit recovery. He noted 
that in O'Neill v. San Pedro R.R. Co., '38 Utah 475, 
11-! Pac. 127, the court had required proof of negli-
7 
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gence for vibration damage due to the operation of 
trains, and had rejected the theory of trespass. He 
therefore reasoned that in a claim for blast dam-
age, due to vibration, negligence would also have 
to be shown. Since in the insta:nt case there is no 
trespass, the proper pleading would be trespass on 
the case and negligence would have to be alleged 
and proved.2 As noted by Justice Wolfe: "Being an 
action in case, negligence must be alleged and 
proved.'' 
It would seem, therefore, that what Utah pre-
cedent there is would not apply the concept of strict 
liability in this case. In Stevens-Salt Lake City v. 
Wong, 1'23 Utah 309, 259 P. 2d 586 (1'953), the 
court refused to apply a concept of strict liability 
to bursting water pipes that caused water to escape 
into plaintiff's building.a The court noted that even 
if the con cepit of strict liability were to be adopted 
it would, based on California precedent (Green v. 
General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 
952) , only be applicable where there is a showing 
that the defendant 1acted ''deliberately" under 
"known conditions, and, with knowledge that in-
jury may result." Even applying the concept to the 
instant case it would appear plaintiff could not 
recover since that rule is merely another way of 
alleging negligence, Harper & J1ames, The Law of 
2 The appellant's amended c'omplaint did allege negligence but he 
apparently abandoned th'is position on appeal in favor of absolute 
liaJbility. 
3 ·Thus rejecting the Rylands v. Fletcher, supra., concept 
8 
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Torts, Sec. 14.7, p. 817. Since if the defendants 
did an act, knowing that injury was likely, this it-
~rlf may be negligence. Further, the respondents 
certainly did not deliberately do a dangerous act 
knowing that injury may result. Indeed the injury 
in this circumstance Wlas probably unforseeable and 
thus outside the realm of proximate cause, Kleppsch 
v. Donald 4 Wash. 436, 30 Pac. 991 (1892). In 
addition, this court has refused to recognize liability 
for flooding damage in the absence of prayer of 
negligence. In Brain v. Fremont Irr. Co., 186 Pac. 
2d 588, 112 Utah 220, (Utah 1'947), this court ruled 
that a complaint failed to state a cause of action 
based on flood damage where there was no allega-
tion of negligence. 
Since the Utah precedent :seems to reject the 
application of strict liability it would appear that 
the plaintiff does not have a cause of action based 
on that theory. 
Secondly it is submitted an additional reason 
exists in this case why the rule is not properly ap-
plicable, that being tba:t there was no "escape" 
from the defendant's lands. The only case that ap-
pears to have directly considered the issue has held 
the concept of strict liability inapplicable to an ex-
plosion injuring a person where there was no escape 
from the premises. In Read v. J. Lyons Company, 
1947, A.C. 1'56, a land mark decision, the House 
of Lords so ruled noting that the Ryln,nds v. Fletcher 
case had required such escape. The ·appellant, an 
9 
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arm1aments worker, was injured when a shell ex-
ploded on the premises where she was employed. 
She claimed recovery on the basis of strict liability. 
Viscount 1Simon noted: 
"'The duties of an occupier of premises to an 
invitee have been analysed in many reported 
cases, but in none of them, I think, is there 
any hint of the proposition necessary to sup-
port the claim of the a ppellian t in this case. 
* * * 
Now the strict liability recogn1zed by this 
House to exist in Rylands v. Fletcher is con-
ditioned by two elements which I may call 
the condition of 'escape' from the land of 
something likely to do miscHief if it escapes, 
and the condition of "non-natural use" of the 
land." 
'Thus the House of Lords properly reasoned 
thJat escape is essential to the strict liability rule, 
since if the injured person is otherwise on the lands 
where the activity is being carried on the legal rules 
applicable to licensees, guests, and invitees are ap-
plicable, which requires negligence to be shown. It 
should further be noted that Lord MacMillan felt 
strict lianility was no longer applicable in England: 
"In my opinion the appellant's statement of 
claim discloses no ground of action against 
respondents. The action is one of damages 
for personal injuries. Whatever may h!ave 
been the law of England in early times I am 
of opinion that as the law now stands an alle-
gation of negligence is in general essential to 
the relevancy of an action of reparation for 
personal injuries.'' 
10 
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The fact that the jurisdiction which first adopt-
ed the strict liability rule has apparently retreated 
only accentuates the need for a more fleXible rule. 
Prosser, Torts 2nd Ed., p. 336, speaking of the more 
modern tl·end with reference to blasting cases notes: 
"Many of the l;ater cases have come to the 
conclusion that this strict liabilitity is en-
tirely a question of when and how, and that 
the use of explosives on an uninhabited moun-
tainside is a matter of negligence only, but 
that anyone who blasts in the center of a l:arge 
city does so at his peril.'' 4 
Further evidence of a withdrawal from the 
common law concept of strict liability is the position 
evidenced by the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 519, 
520. The later section defines a·n "ultrahazardous 
activity" as requiring two elements. First, the likeli-
hood of harm irrespective of the standard of care, 
and secondly, that the activity be one that "is not 
a matter of common usage." Prosser, Torts 2nd Ed., 
p. 335. Certainly, the technique of blasting has gone 
far beyond the days of Nobel, land in most farm 
communities the use of dynamite is a common mra:tter, 
especially in conjunction with 1irrigation activities. 
Since World War II the techniques of demolition 
have advanced to where there is no need for a strict 
rule of absolute liability. 
4 Prosser cites cases from jurisdictions in the west whose problems 
and environments ·proximate those of Utah. Bedell v. Goulter, 199 
Or. 344, 261 P. 2d 842 (1953); Alonso v. HiUs, supra., (Cal.); Free-
bury v. Chicago, M. & P.S.R. Co., 77 Wash. 464, 137 Pac. 1044 
(1914); Cashin v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P. 2d 862 
1~19~~). Wyoming has completely rejected the concept of absolute 
(Iabllity, Jacoby v. Town of Gillette, 62 Wyo. 487, 174 P. 2d 505 1947). 
11 
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Additionally, the usual concepts of the duty of 
a landowner to a licensee are in conflict with the 
theory of absolute liability. Generally courts have 
based their theories of absolute liability of trespass, 
and most cases have involved concussion damage. 
THis is substantially different than elevating the 
duty to a licensee to one of absolute liability because 
of an activity carried on one's own premises not en-
dangering the community at l:arge. A West Virginia 
Federal Court recognized the distinction in Fairfax 
Inn Inc. v. Sunnyhill Mining Co., 97 F. Supp. 991 
(N.D. W. Va. 19'51), again a trespass concussion 
case where the court commented on the limited duty 
of a landowner in the absence of trespass. !The court 
concerned itself with a West Virgini1a State case that 
had refused to find liability for the escape of a cir-
cus tiger and compared that with the trespass con-
cussion situa~ion. It stated: 
"It also seems to me that there is at least one 
vital distinction between the Vaughan case 
and the case at bar. Vaughan, voluntarily 
and of his own free will, went upon the pro-
perty of the defendant and placed himself 
in a position to be injured. The defendant 
owed him only the du!ty that devolves upon the 
owner of property when someone, even though 
he be an invitee or licensee, comes on the 
property. In the case at bar, the defendant 
caused waves of shock or concussion to travel 
from his property onto the plaintiff's pro-
perty." 
Analogous to the court's reasoning is that of 
12 
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the House of Lords to Read v. J. Lyons Company, 
supra., requiring "escape." 
Thus the many compelling and obvious reasons 
set out above dictates !a decision contrary to the con-
cept of strict liability being urged by the appellant. 
POINT II 
THE A:PPELLANT ASSUMED THE RISK. 
The t:rial court ruled that irrespective of the 
test of liability to be applied in the instant case that 
the appellant should be denied recovery since as 
a m·atter of law he had assumed the risk, and was 
himself negligent. The facts 'in this regard show 
that at the time the appellant was injured he was 
upon the respondents' premises of his own choice. 
He observed that blasting with dynamite was tak-
ing place on the premises, and still rem:ained. Ap-
pellan t had had some prior experience with the use 
of explosives and was a mature middle-aged man. 
He was present during one ·blast where he removed 
himself to a safe distance :and got into a truck for 
protection. Thereafter he discussed blasting pro-
cedures and recommended placing a 'large rock on 
the dynamite. Mter preparation of the charge ap-
pellant rode a distance away from the site of the 
blast, but he did not dismount nis horse and seek 
protection in the truck. He had observed all the 
preparations for blasting. 'He was not an employee of 
the respondents or an independent contractor who 
might suffer economic loss by not leaving the blast 
area. He voluntarily remained as an interested spec-
13 
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tator knowing full well the dangers involved. Un-
der these circumstances it is clear that the trial 
court's determination that appelliant assumed the 
risk is correct. 
In Jacques v. Farimond, 14 Utah 2d 166, 380 
P. 2d 133 (1963) this court noted: 
'~The denial of recovery because of assump-
tion of risk of willful misconduct is based upon 
the same reasoning as 1in a case of ordin:ary 
negligence: that the pla'intiff knew and ap-
preciated the ·hazards; that he had a reason-
a:ble opportunity to make an alternative 
choice; and that he voluntarily assumed the 
risk. In both cases the underlying principle is 
that one who fails to use reasonable care for 
his own safety, which contributes to cause his 
injury, should not be permitted to recover 
from another for 'it." 
This is the accepted ,standard of determining 
assumption of risk. In the instant case appel1ant 
clearly appreciated the risks involved, volunteered 
to pa~tici pate although he had no economic or other 
compulsion to do so, and could have left at anytime 
he desired. 
The Restatement of Torts, Sec. 523, notes that 
the concept of allowing recovery for injuries due to 
ultra-hazardous activities does not apply in certain 
instances: 
"The rule stated in Sec. 519 does not apply 
where the person harmed by the unprevent-
a:ble miscarriage of an ultl1a-hazardous acti-
vity has reason to know of the risk which 
makes the activity ultrahazardous and 
(a) takes part in it, or 
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(b) brings himself wi th1n the :area 
which will be endangered by its 
miscarriage." 
Under the Restatement test it is clear that the 
appellant's cause of action, if any he had, is barred 
because in this case :appellant 'both took part in the 
acti vi1ty and brought himse If within the danger 
area. 
Prosser, Torts 2nd Ed., p. 342, also notes that 
assumption of risk is a defense in absolute liability 
cases. See also Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 51, 1'18 Atl. 
467 ( 1922) ; Wells v. Knight, 32 R.I. 432, 80 Atl. 
16 ( 1911). The Arizona Supreme Court in Twohy 
Bros. v. Kepon, 21 Ariz. 606, 193 Pac. 296 (19120), 
denied liability for blasting injury where the plain-
tiff with notice remained in the area and was fami-
liar with the fact that blasting work was being 
carried on in the ;area. 'This rule has been followed 
in Le~"t·ington & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Fields, 1'5·2 Ky. 
19, 153 S.W. 43 ( 1913) ; Adams' Admr. v. Callis & 
Hughes, 253 Ky. 382, 69 S.W. 2d 711 (19'34); 
Graetz v. McKenzie, 9 Wash. 696, 315 Pa'c. 377 
(1893). 
In Smith v. Day, 117 Fed. 956 (1902), the 
court ruled tbat plaintiff had assumed the risk in 
going on the premises knowing of the danger at-
tendant to blasting. The court noted: 
"The plaintiff and his fellow passengers went 
upon the premises where the blasting was be-
ing done with their eyes open. Their right 
there, whether it was a ngh't by sufference 
or license, implied or otherwise, was subordin-
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ate to the right of the defendants to prosecute 
the work in which they were engaged. These 
passengers assumed all risks necessarily in-
cident 'to such work . . . " 
In Wells v. Knight, 3'2 R.I. 432, 80 Alt. 16 
( 1911) , 'blasting was being done on ia bridge. The 
deceased had warning of lthe blasts, watched 'as to 
where the stones were falling, and then proceeded 
along a path which he apparently felt gafe. There-
after, another blast went off which ki'lled the de-
ceased when he was struck by a stone. The court 
held that the evidence was sufficient to require a 
finding of contributory negligence, which under the 
Rhode Island requirement of showing primary neg-
ligence would support a fi'nding of :assumption of 
risk also. A simHar conclusion on a like factual basis 
was reached by the Ari~ona court in Twohy Bros. 
v. Kepon, 121 Ariz. 606, 193 Pac. 296 (1920). 
In Adams' Adm'r. v. Callis & Hughes, 'supva., 
the deceased was the owner of an adoining quarry. 
Each quarry would give notice to the other before 
blasting. The deceased had notice of the 'impending 
blast and had opportunity to reach safety. He took 
only limited precautions. The court held he had 
assumed the risk. 
See also Cary Bros. & Hannon v. Morrisson, 
12'9 Fed. 177 ( 1904), holding th'at one having knowl-
edge of the conditions 'Of blasting who remains in 
the area i's guilt of contributory negligence in assum-
ing the r'isk. 
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The cases cited by the appellant involved situ-
ations distinctly different from that of the instant 
case. The persons concerned in the cwses cited by 
appellant were often hound by 1an employment situ-
ation which limited their free choice. Secondly, there 
was no participation by the persons 'in the actual 
blasting, and little time for the individual to truely 
avail himself of a safe position. None of the cases 
have application in the instant ~situation. All things 
being considered it is clear the trial court ruled 
correctly, Jacques v. Farimond, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The appelliant's contentions on 'appe'al afford 
him no basis for reversal. Appellant has argued for 
the doctrine of absolute liabililty. A:lthough in Mad-
sen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 101 Utah 552, 
1~5 P. '2d 794 (1942), Justice Pratt ~acknowledged 
that at that time a:bsolute li'a:bility was the majority 
rule, the court did not pass on its application in Utah 
since (1) the parties had conceded the application 
of the rule for the 'appeal and ( 2) the only issue was 
proximate cause. Since the court now has :an oppor-
tunity for the first time to examine the rule ih light 
of the more flexible rules now being applied and 
contrary Utah decisions, it should reject the doctrine 
in this case. 
Further, irrespective of the applicability rule 
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the uncontroverted facts, based upon Appellant's 
deposition, show thalt appellant assumed the risk 
of injury. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectively submi'tted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN and 
REX J. HANSON 
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